Wireless energy harvesting networks are more vulnerable to eavesdropping due to higher received power levels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Though, dense small-cell networks, Internet of Things, and ad-hoc networks are bringing revolution to meet the standards of future fifth-generation (5G) wireless communication systems [1] , [2] , however, such densification and broadcast nature of such networks make the wireless devices more prone to malicious attacks of adversaries [3] - [6] . The adversaries attempt to eavesdrop upon the normal information flows [7] .
The closer proximity of users in coordinating small cells make them more vulnearable to eavesdroppers.
Particularly, if we consider wireless power transfer via energy harvesting (EH) through received radio frequency (RF) signals [8] , which is not only viable in small-cell deployment due to closer promixty between base station (BS) and user equipment (UE) but also benefitial to address the increased energy consupmtion concern in densified networks [9] , the wireless EH receivers get more prone of being eavesdropped due to higher received power levels [10] . Physical layer security can promise secure data transmissions in such networks [11] - [14] .
In order to realize both wireless energy harvesting and information decoding (ID), the two basic receiver structures that are mostly adopted at the receivers are power splitting (PS) and time switching (TS) [15] .
The basic concept is that information and energy are simultaneously transmitted through same signal by the BS. Next, in PS approach, a power splitter at the receiver divides the received signal into two parts of distinct powers, one for ID and another for EH and in TS approach, a time switch is applied on the received signal, such that portion of the total time is used for EH while remaining time is used for ID.
Though, the simpler implementation of such TS structure is an attractive feature [8] , [16] - [18] , however the performance of the TS approach can be worse than the PS approach [16] . If we name the abovementioned TS approach a "receive TS approach", there is another option of "transmit TS approach", which we aim to consider in this work. In transmit TS approach, information and energy can be transmitted by BS in different portions of time and UE then can process the received signals for ID and EH separately in the respective time.
Recently, transmit beamforming design at the BS for secrecy rate maximization under BS transmit power constraints has achieved researchers' considerable attention [19] - [22] . Beamforming requires the knowledge of downlink channels to the UEs, which can be obtained via channel estimation. However, due to channel estimation errors in practical systems, the BS cannot expect perfect channel knowledge, which demands for robust beamforming design in the presence of channel uncertainties [19] , [21] . Adding wireless energy harvesting (EH) feature due to its viability in dense small-cell deployment introduces another EH constraint in normal secrecy rate optimization problem. As mentioned above, physical layer security is more relevant in wireless power transfer systems.
Our focus is robust beamforming design to maximize secrecy rate in the presence of BS transmit power constraint, receiver EH constraint, and channel uncertainties [23] - [28] . Some of these works assume either EH functionality or ID functionality at the UEs [26] , [27] . Thus, they don't provide simultaneous EH and ID capabilities and hence, they don't need to implement PS or TS based simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) receivers. Assuming PS-based SWIPT receivers, secrecy rate maximization is studied in [23] - [25] , [28] . However, it is well known that it is not practically easy to implement variable range power splitter. In addition, with PS approach, one can not jam the eavesdropper without using artificial noise. Moreover, these works employ semi-definite programming where rank-one constraints have to be dropped and computationally complex matrices have to be optimized. Sometimes, randomization has to be employed to achieve feasible beamforming vectors [28] . As noted in [29] , such randomization is not always efficient. To the best of our knowledge, computational solution for robust beamforming design to achieve secrecy rate optimization, particularly assuming practical TS-based wireless EH systems, is still an open problem.
In this paper, we consider a multicell network, in which a multi-antenna BS in each cell communicates with its serving users (UEs). The UEs are divided into two groups on the basis of their distance from the serving BS. The UEs in the near vicinity of the BS (near UEs) implement SWIPT while far-away UEs (far UEs) conduct information decoding only. We assume a single multi-antenna eavesdropper, who tries to decode information for any user equipment (UE). We consider imperfect channel state information (CSI) case where the BSs have imperfect channel knowledge about UEs and eavesdroppers. We propose a worst-case based robust formulation where the CSI errors are norm bounded. We implement transmit TS approach where information and energy is transmitted by BS in different portions of the time. The energy beamformers can be exploited to jam the eavesdroppers. In the presence of channel uncertainties, we aim to jointly optimize transmit beamforming vectors and transmit TS ratio for near UEs to maximize the worst secrecy rate of all UEs under EH constraints for near UEs and BS transmit power constraints.
We propose path-following optimization algorithm to solve such highly non-convex problem. Avoiding rank-constrained optimization, our algorithm requires minimum number of variables, and computationally quite fast as converges in few iterations. We compare the EH constrained secrecy rate performance with the normal rates achieved in the absence of eavesdroppers. Our simulation results show that secrecy rate of our proposed algorithm is close to the achievable normal rates in the absence of eavesdroppers.
Furthermore, our numerical results confirm that performance of the proposed algorithm is close to that of the perfect channel knowledge case. In addition, the proposed algorithm not only outperforms the existing algorithm that models power-splitting (PS) based receiver but also the proposed transmit TS based model is implementation-wise quite simple than the PS-based model.
Notation. Standard notation is used throughout the paper. In particular, {·} denotes the real part of its argument, ∇ denotes the first-order differential operator, x and X F denote the Euclidean and Frobenius norm of a vector x and matrix X, respectively, and x, y x H y.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a downlink of a dense network consisting of K small cells with universal frequency reuse.
As shown in Fig. 1 , the BS of a cell k ∈ K {1, . . . , K} is equipped with M > 1 antennas and it serves N k single-antenna UEs within its cell. By BS k and UE (k, n), we mean the BS that serves cell k and the UE n ∈ N k {1, . . . , N k } of the same cell, respectively. The N k UEs in cell k are divided into two groups, i.e., i) N 1,k zone-1 users, which are located nearby their serving BS inside the inner circle, and ii) N 2,k zone-2 users, which are located far from their serving BS in the outer circle, such that, 
We assume that BSs transmits energy to only zone-1 users, which being close to their serving BSs, can practically harvest energy, while information is transmitted to both zone-1 and zone-2 users. Let us denote w E k,n 1 stored in a battery and later used to power the operations of UE (k, n 1 ) (e.g., processing the received signals in the downlink, or transmitting data to the BS in the uplink). There and after w
The complex baseband signal received by UE (k, n) for ID is
The first term in (4) is the intended signal for UE n, the second term is the intracell interference from within cell k, and the third term is the intercell interference from other cellsk ∈ K \ {k}. Let us assume that each BS is able to perfectly know about its own users' channel state information, which is justified in dense small cell network, however, the inter-cell channel state information hk ,k,n is available through channel estimation subject to certain uncertainty. We assume that the BSs perform channel estimation to acquire channel knowledge hk ,k,n and the channel state information (CSI) errors are bounded by the uncertainty k ,k,n as follows: [30] , [31] 
where ρ(A) is called the spectral radius of matrix A: ρ(A) = max i |λ i (A)| with its eigenvalues λ i (A), and the channel uncertainties k ,k,n are given by
where o and 1 are the normalized uncertainty levels related to neighboring cells' UEs and the serving cells' UEs, respectively. 1 Note that (5) covers all uncertainty structures [31] . Thus, incorporating the channel unceratinties, the worst-case information rate decoded by UE (k, n) is given by [31] (
where w
Let us consider that for UE (k, n) there is single eavesdropper k with N ev antennas in the zone-1, which tries to eavesdrop on the received signal of UE (k, n). Thus the signal y k ∈ C Nev×1 for the UE (k, n)
observed at the EV k in cell k is given by
where H k,k of size M ×N ev is the corresponding wiretap channel and z a k ∈ C N ev is the noise [6] , [32] - [34] .
We assume that the wiretap channel state information Hk ,k is available through channel estimation subject to some uncertainty [30] , [31] 
where
and o is the normalized uncertainty level for the channels between BSs and the eavesdroppers. Therefore, the worst received SINR corresponding to the signal intended for the UE (k, n) 1 We have introduced two different uncertainty levels because later we will show in Section IV that secrecy rate is more sensitive to the estimation errors of serving users' channels compared to that of the neighboring users' channels.
at the EV k is given by [31] SINR
where w w E ; w I The main attractive feature is that the EH signals are also explored for confusing the EV k. The achievable secrecy rate at UE (k, n) in nat/sec/Hz is thus given by [35] 
The corresponding rate in bits/sec/Hz can be calculated by evaluating
We aim to jointly optimize the transmit beamforming vectors w E k,n 1 and w I k,n , the TS ratio α to maximize the worst secrecy rate of UEs
Constraint (14b) caps the total transmit power of each BS k at a predefined value P max k . Constraint (14c)
ensures that the total transmit power of the network not exceed the allowable budget P max . Constraint (14d) requires that the minimum energy harvested by UE (k, n 1 ) be greater than some target threshold
. Note that problem (14) is highly non-convex, where each constraint (14b)-(14d) and the objective (14a), all are non-convex due to coupling between beamforming vectors w and time splitting factor α.
III. PROPOSED ITERATIVE OPTIMIZATION
In order to solve non-convex problem (14) , first let us make the following variable change of variable:
which satisfies the linear constraint
In what follows, we first transform the original max-min secrecy rate problem (14) into a new variable β and then convexify it.
Transformation of Problem (14) into a new variable β: Using (15), the power constraints (14b) and (14c) become the following constraints:
and applying (15) 
By applying the variable change 1 − α = 1 β in (13), the achievable secrecy rate in new variable β is given
and by using q k,n (w, α) in (12),q k,n (w, β) is defined as follows:
Using (17), (18) , and (26), the equivalent of problem (14) in variables w and β is given by at κth iteration, by using the following approximation:
Thus using (23) , inner convex approximation of non-convex constraints (17a) and (17b) is given by
Next, we will convexify the EH constraint (18) in variable β. Following the definition of p k,n 1 (w E ) in (3), and using the approximation
the inner approximation of nonconvex constraint (18) is given by
Using the convex approximations (24) and (26) for the constraints of problem (22), we achieve at the following problem at κth iteration:
s.t. (24a), (24b), (26), (16). (27b)
As observed in [36] , forw
The problem (27) is thus equivalent to the following optimization problem:
(24a), (24b), (26) , (16) .
Convex Approximation of the Objective (28a): Next, we have to convexify the objective (28a).We have to find concave lower bound approximation off k,n (w, β) at κth iteration w (κ) , β (κ) . Thus, we need to develop a lower bounding concave function for the first termf 
Theorem 1:
The lower bounding concave functionf
for
and
The upper bounding convex functionf
with
where constraint (36) at κth iteration can be approximated as (37) and
Proof: See Appendix A.
Thus, using Theorem 1, the following convex program provides minorant maximization for the nonconvex program (28) for a given (w (26), (16), (28b), (31), (35), (37), (38) . (14)) is summarized in Algorithm 1. We can show that Algorithm 1 generates
of improved points of (39), which converges to a KKT point. In Solve convex program (39) for w E,(κ+1) , w I,(κ+1) , β (κ+1) .
5:
Set κ := κ + 1.
6: until convergence of the objective in (22) .
Algorithm 1, the feasible point w E,(0) , w I,(0) , β (0) of (22) (and hence (14)) is found as follows. We fix β (0) and solve the following convex problem for fixed r min > 0:
where, in order to ensure quick convergence, we introduce a constraint (40c) on SINR-UE k,n , i.e., the information rate of UE (k, n) should be greater than threshold rate r min . The constraint (40c) has been formulated as a second-order cone constraint [37] . After solving (40), we propose to iteratively solve the following convex problem:
where the initial point w
for (41) is obtained from the solution of (40) . Problem (41) is solved for κ = 0, 1, 2, . . . until a positive optimal value is attained. If problem (40) or (41) is infeasible with β or solving (41) fails to give a positive optimal value, we repeat the above process for a different value of and two inside the outer-zone, i.e., N 1,k = N 2,k = 2, ∀ k. We set the cell radius as 40m and the BS-to-UE distance is 7 m and 20 m in the inner and outer zone of each cell, respectively. We assume that a single N ev = 2-antennas eavesdropper is randomly placed in each cell inside the inner circle. In our simulation setup, their placements are at 5 m, 10 m, and 15 m from the respective BSs in three cells as shown in Fig. 2 . We set the path loss exponent as β = 3. For small-scale fading, we generate Rician fading according to Rician factor, K R = 10 dB [38] . For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that the minimum energy harvesting requirement e min k,n 1 = e min and the energy harvesting efficiency ζ k,n 1 = ζ, ∀k, n 1 (for UEs inside inner circle). In all simulations, we set ζ = 0.5 and σ 2 a = −90 dBm. We further set the maximum power of each BS as P max k = 26 dBm, which is consistent with the power budget usually assumed for small-cell BSs [39] , and we set the maximum power budget for the whole network to be P max = 30 dBm. Unless stated otherwise, we choose the uncertainty in eavesdroppers' and neighboring users' channels, 0 = 0.005 and we choose the uncertainty in serving users' channels 1 = 10 −3 . It is justified to assume that BSs can achieve good channel estimates for their serving cell users compared to the neighboring cell users in a dense small cell network. Number of BS antennas, M Harvested energy threshold, e min (dBm) minimal loss on the achievable rate, while inclusion of channel uncertainty in the serving cell users' channels, i.e., ( o = 0.005, 1 = 10 −3 ) has a visible effect on the achievable rates, especially for higher number of BS antennas. There is a very important engineering insight here that secrecy rate is more sensitive to the estimation errors of serving users' channels compared to that of the neighboring users' channels. Moreover, we observe that the optimized rate by the proposed Algorithm 1 is quite close to that achieved by the upper bound imposed situation (absence of eavesdroppers) on Algorithm 1. 4 shows that the rate is almost linearly increasing with number of antennas from 3 to 6. Fig. 5 shows that rate decreases by increasing the EH targets, which does make sense as more power is required for EH to achieve a high EH target, which decreases the available power for information decoding and so does the same to the information rate. Overall, Figs. 4 and 5 indicate the robustness of our proposed Algorithm 1. Fig. 6 plots the worst user secrecy rate and worst user normal rate (in the absence of eavesdroppers) [10] . Since, perfect channel state information ( o = 0, 1 = 0) has been assumed in [10] , thus to ensure fair comparison in Fig. 7 , we solve the proposed Algorithm 1 assuming no channel uncertainty o = 1 = 0. Fig. 7 plots the worst user secrecy rate versus number of antennas M for fixed energy harvesting threshold e min = −20 dBm. We can clearly observe a gain of around 0.5 bits/sec/Hz in the achieved secrecy rate of the proposed Algorithm 1 compared to that of the algorithm in [10] . Note that the proposed TS-based system not only enjoys the performance gain, but also promises implementation simplicity. The average number of iterations required for convergence are almost same for both the proposed Algorithm 1 and the algorithm in [10] . However, the proposed TS-based system model has a two-fold advantage; it not only enjoys the performance gain, but also promises implementation simplicity APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In order to prove theorem 1, let us first prove the lower bounding concave function expression in (30) .
Note that the functionf 
